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HOT AIR: UNDUE JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO FEDERAL





W EN THE FEDERAL Aviation Administration (FAA) de-
cides to expand an existing airport, or construct a new
one, environmental considerations are often ignored or under-
valued. Hundreds of acres of wetlands have been filled, endan-
gered species have lost their habitat, national parks have been
blasted with jet noise, and the air and water have been polluted
because of airport projects. The airplane has caused a negative
impact on the environment since its invention, when the Wright
brothers' first attempts at flight had the potential to disturb the
ecology of the dunes near Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. In the
one hundred years since that flight, aviation has caused a signifi-
cant amount of damage to the environment.
The FAA regulates, and therefore should be responsible for,
the noise pollution caused by aircraft, the chemicals used for de-
icing aircraft that flow into streams and lakes, the emissions
from aviation fuel exhaust, the reduction of habitat caused by
creating and expanding runways, and the potential for transfer-
ring insect or plant pests as unwanted stowaways to sensitive hab-
itats. The courts' deference to the FAA's decisions approving
these actions has limited the FAA's liability for environmental
damage. Other aviation professionals, including pilots, airport
operators, and aircraft manufacturers, need to take action to
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protect the environment, particularly in situations where the
FAA has refused to act.
The FAA has been granted broad powers to regulate aircraft
and airports.' Although Congress has enacted numerous stat-
utes to protect the environment and preserve our natural re-
sources, federal courts accord the FAA excessive and
inappropriate deference, which undermines these statutes. Def-
erence by the courts to FAA decisions relating to aviation safety
is well founded because FAA employees are acknowledged as ex-
perts on such areas. Such deference is inappropriate when the
FAA decides that proposed action will have no adverse effect on
the environment because the FAA has no expertise in environ-
mental concerns. The FAA has also made determinations on
such matters as the destruction of ecosystem biodiversity by infil-
tration of non-native species, 2 the impact of aircraft noise on a
Native American reservation, 3 and the impact ofjet engine emis-
sions on human health.4 In some cases, the FAA consults envi-
ronmental agencies, such as the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice ("FWS"). Courts should question these determinations and
deem them arbitrary and capricious if made without appropri-
ate expert environmental advice. Additionally, the EPA and
FWS, and other agencies that have such expertise, should have
more authority in aviation decisions that affect the environment.
This article will discuss each of the relevant federal environ-
mental laws and explain how these laws have provided inade-
quate protection for the environment when courts defer to FAA
decisions to construct or expand airports. Each impact on the
environment, including noise, habitat loss, water pollution, and
air pollution, will be analyzed separately. Finally, strategies for
improving the current environmental management of the avia-
tion industry will be suggested. One of the authors is both a pri-
vate pilot and an author of a case book on aviation law5 and is
not in favor of curtailing the joys of general aviation or the con-
venience of commercial flight. However, our aviation industry
1 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000).
2 Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d
677, 679 (9th Cir. 2000).
3 Town of Cave Creek v. FAA, 325 F.3d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
4 Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, No. 02-1062, 2003 WL 21546006, at *6 (4th
Cir. July 10, 2003).
5 See WENDY B. DAVIS, AVIATION LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS (William S. Hein &
Co., Publishing 2004).
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must be managed in a more environmentally responsible man-
ner, and preservation of our natural resources must take priority
over matters of mere convenience.
I. APPLICABLE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES.
The FAA must determine whether runway expansion or con-
struction projects will significantly affect the environment, as de-
fined by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),6 before
the FAA approves such a project. Surface water runoff from run-
ways, contaminated with de-icing chemicals and fuel exhaust,
may violate the Clean Water Act (CWA).7 The Endangered Spe-
cies Act (ESA) 8 may apply if expansion or relocation of runways
will destroy habitats. Aircraft emissions impact air quality and
must comply with the Clean Air Act (CAA).9 Airports that are
located near public parks or historic areas may violate the De-
partment of Transportation Act because of noise pollution or
other environmental impact.10 Each of these statutes will be con-
sidered below.
A. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
When enacted in 1969, NEPA11 was intended to be "the most
important and far-reaching conservation and environmental
measure ever acted upon by the Congress .... [It] is a congres-
sional declaration that we do not intend ... to initiate actions
which endanger the continued existence or the health of man-
kind. ' 12 Since its enactment, NEPA has proven to be little more
than a procedural hurdle with no impact on the substantive out-
come of proposed federal projects.
NEPA requires federal agencies proposing major actions sig-
nificantly affecting the human environment to prepare an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement ("EIS"). 13 Agencies will usually
first prepare an Environmental Assessment ("EA") to determine
whether an EIS is required or whether a Finding of No Signifi-
6 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-54 (2000).
8 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
9 42 U.S.C. § 7506.
10 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2004).
11 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
12 115 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson).
13 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); see also Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1972).
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cant Impact ("FONSI") is appropriate.14 NEPA requires the
preparation of an EIS when the facts alleged, if true, "show that
the proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of en-
vironmental quality."15 The EIS must include a discussion of the
environmental impact of the proposed action and any reasona-
ble alternative actions." The EIS must consider all foreseeable
direct and indirect effects, and the consideration given must
amount to a "hard look" at the environmental effects.1 7 NEPA
has not been applied as a substantive statute, and so long as the
environmental damage is identified and evaluated, the agency is
not prohibited from deciding that its goals outweigh the envi-
ronmental costs.1" NEPA "prohibits uninformed, rather than
unwise, agency action."19 While the EIS must consider alterna-
tives to the proposed action, it need not consider all of the alter-
natives, only those that are reasonable in light of the stated
purpose of the project. 2°
NEPA does not provide adequate protection for the environ-
ment when airport projects are involved. The FAA has been suc-
cessful in convincing courts that airline safety, convenience, and
the prevention of commercial flight delays are more important
than the resulting damage to the environment. Courts have ac-
corded such a high degree of deference to the FAA's determina-
tions that they have thwarted the environmental laws.21
Whether the goal of airport expansion was to prevent delays in
commercial flights22 or to provide training opportunities for
14 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(C) (2004).
15 City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975) (citations
omitted).
16 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (i) (iii).
17 See Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 685 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
18 See, e.g., Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1035-36 (10th
Cir. 2001).
19 Id. at 1034.
20 See, e.g., Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, No. 02-1062, 2003 WL 2156006, at
*3.
21 Petitioners are often denied a voice in court to review FAA orders, as when
the Second Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review FAA approval
of an airport layout plan in Comm. to Stop Airport Expansion v. FAA, 320 F.3d 285,
286-87 (2d Cir. 2003). The court found that its jurisdiction was limited to the
review of orders with respect to aviation safety duties and that the approval of an
airport layout plan fell under a separate part of the statute that did not specifi-
cally grantjurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, leaving jurisdiction exclusively to
the district court. Id. at 287.
22 See Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, 355 F.3d at 682.
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military pilots,23 courts have supported FAA decisions despite
significant environmental impact. For example, courts have up-
held FAA orders that (1) threatened significant disturbance of
livestock or migratory birds,2 4 (2) allowed hundreds of acres of
wetlands to be filled in, 25 (3) created a noise level that was ex-
pected to cause some people to be "highly annoyed, 26 and (4)
increased the noise level at historic national parks. 27 NEPA
would have more of a substantive impact if courts gave less def-
erence to the FAA decisions.
Although the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 28 pro-
vides for judicial review of agency action, courts have limited
their review of the FAA's FONSI decisions to whether the FAA
"reasonably concluded that the project will have no significant
adverse environmental consequences. '29 The party challenging
the FAA action must prove that the FAA decision was "arbitrary
and capricious. "30 This deference is not appropriate because
FAA personnel are not experts in environmental protection or
preservation. The FAA should be required to obtain the input
and approval of the EPA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or
other appropriate federal or state environmental experts in
making these decisions. Precedent and good reason exist for
this type of coordination among agencies. For example, the
FAA and the EPA are required to consult about determinations
relating to emissions limitations for aircraft engines.31 This co-
ordination among federal agencies should be expanded.
23 See Lee v. United States Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004).
24 Id. at 1244; see also Welch v. United States Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797, 802
(N.D. Tex. 2003). Welch held the FAA's order sufficient to satisfy the NEPA re-
quirements. However, in a consolidated appeal of three separate challenges to
the FAA in this matter, the Fifth Circuit abrogated portions of the Welch deci-
sion. Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass'n v. FAA, No. 02-60288, 03-
10506, 03-10528, 2004 WL 2295986 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004). For example, the
Fifth Circuit refused to overturn the lower court's determination that the EIS
adequately considered the impact to livestock and birds, but held the EIS inade-
quately addressed the economic impact of low-level Air Force flights on the com-
munity. The court required the FAA to further study and address this impact in a
supplemental EIS.
25 See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 235 (Alaska 2003).
26 See Welch, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 840; see supra text accompanying note 19.
27 See Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 153 (1st Cir. 2001).
28 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2000).
29 See California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 260 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (citation omitted).
30 See Welch, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 810; see supra text accompanying note 19.
31 14 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
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The Fifth Circuit has set forth three criteria to determine
whether an EIS is adequate:
(1) whether the agency in good faith objectively has taken a
hard look at the environmental consequences of a proposed
action and alternatives;
(2) whether the EIS provides detail sufficient to allow those who
did not participate in its preparation to understand and con-
sider the pertinent environmental influences involved; and
(3) whether the EIS explanation of alternatives is sufficient to
permit a reasoned choice among different causes of action.3 2
Even within the framework of this deferential standard for re-
view of FAA decisions, courts should conclude that the FAA did
not take a hard look at the environmental consequences when-
ever the appropriate environmental experts were not involved.
Furthermore, Congress should amend NEPA to require that en-
vironmental considerations take priority over concerns of mere
convenience or economy.
President George W. Bush has sought to undermine even the
limited impact of NEPA by an executive order.3 3 The order ac-
knowledged the importance of transportation infrastructure
projects and created an Interagency Task Force within the De-
partment of Transportation to assist agencies in expediting envi-
ronmental review and streamlining the process of issuing
permits.34 The order undermines the NEPA requirement that
agencies take a "hard look" at environmental impacts. It is also
particularly damaging to the effectiveness of NEPA because the
Supreme Court has held that if a statutory deadline for a project
is too short for an agency to prepare an EIS, then no EIS is re-
quired .3 The impact of this executive order has yet to be real-
ized, but the order, in effect, gives the FAA the opportunity to
ignore important environmental ramifications for the sake of
mere convenience. The administration and the courts should
give more of a priority to the prevention of irreversible environ-
mental harm.
B. CLEAN WATER ACT
The CWA prohibits un-permitted discharges of pollutants
from point sources into the navigable waters of the United
32 Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2000).
33 Exec. Order No. 13,274, 67 Fed. Reg. 59,449 (Sept. 18, 2002).
34 Id. at *59,449.
35 Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 777 (1976).
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States. 6 A National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit, which imposes effluent limitations on dis-
charges, is required for the release of any of these pollutants. 7
A controversy exists over whether pesticides, which are properly
administered and approved by the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)3 8 are deemed pollutants
under the CWA, thereby triggering the requirement of an
NPDES permit.39 Individual states have enacted a variety of stat-
utes concerning pesticide drift and overspray caused by crop
dusting, but there is no federal regulation or uniformity among
state laws.40 Pesticides should be deemed to be pollutants under
the CWA, and cropdusters should be required to obtain an
NPDES permit. Aerial application of pesticides should result in
liability for damage to adjoining property; however, reliance on
private lawsuits to control environmental harm is not sufficient.
These issues are discussed in Section II (A) below. Regulations
should provide for fines and penalties as a consequence of envi-
ronmental damage.
Another potential source of water pollution is de-icing fluids
which spill off the runways and enter the waterways, as discussed
in Section II (D) below. Pilots are prohibited from flying aircraft
with ice on the aircraft surfaces, because the ice can impair the
aerodynamics of the plane.41 Airports are required to have an
approved de-icing/anti-icing program, but nothing in the regu-
lations requires recapture, recovery, or treatment of these chem-
icals, or dictates the type of chemicals used.42 Non-chemical
alternatives, such as heat or compressed air blowers to remove
ice and snow from aircraft surfaces and runways should be ex-
plored as less harmful alternatives.
C. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Congress pledged through the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
to "conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish
36 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
37 Id.
38 7 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000).
39 See Kelly C. Connelly, Pesticides and Permits: Clean Water Act v. Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2003).
40 See Theodore A. Feitshans, An Analysis of State Pesticide Drift Laws, 9 SAN JOA-
QUIN AGRIC. REv. 37 (1999).
41 14 C.F.R. § 121.629 (2004).
42 See id.
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or wildlife and plants facing extinction. ' 43 Under the ESA, areas
are defined as critical habitats, either when occupied by an en-
dangered or threatened species, or when designated as impor-
tant for the recovery of a threatened species.44 The Secretary of
the Interior has authority to designate critical habitats and to
limit the activities that may occur within such areas.45 Permits
may be issued under the act for actions that will result in the
"taking" (killing) of a member of an endangered or threatened
species." Courts have been less than diligent in their protection
of habitats located in proposed runway sites or near airports
where noise may harm endangered species, as discussed in sec-
tion 11 (B) below.
D. CLEAN AIR ACT
The purpose of the CAA is to "protect and enhance the qual-
ity of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its popula-
tion."47 The CAA has not been a factor in decisions on runway
locations, but it should be. The FAA contends that there is "no
known cause and effect relationship between airplane emissions
and human health."48 The Fourth Circuit has found it reasona-
ble for the FAA not to study these effects further, and to omit
such effects from an EIS when the EPA signs off on projected
omission levels. 49 Studies indicate that aircraft emissions, both
during takeoff and while flying at altitude, adversely affect the
ozone layer of the atmosphere and air quality on the surface."° It
is not logical that jet aircraft emissions do not adversely affect
human health, when the adverse effects of automobile emissions
are acknowledged. 5' The Fourth Circuit's position is also con-
43 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
- 50 C.F.R. § 424.02(d).
45 Id. § 424.10.
46 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
47 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).
48 Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, No. 02-1062, 2003 WL 21546006, at *624
(4th Cir.July 10, 2003).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Europa, National Emissions Ceilings Future Developments, Study on Air
Quality Impacts of Non-Lead Emissions from Aviation, at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/environment/air/future ceilings.htm; R.E. Ruthenberg, Odor Perception
Thresholds Versus Danger Levels of Airborne Gas and Particular Matter (Sept. 18, 2002),
at http://www.areco.org/odorstudy.pdf.
51 See, e.g., Gov't of British Columbia, Protecting the Air We Breathe: A British Co-
lumbia Action Plan for Cleaner Air (Dec. 1995), at http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/air/
vehicle/ptawbabc.html; see also Lovelace Respiratory Institute, New Discoveries
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trary to the findings of the EPA. In 2003, the EPA reported that
aircraft in the United States accounted for about one percent of
the nitrous oxide from mobile sources in our atmosphere.5 2 Ox-
ides of nitrogen contribute to ozone formation, which can irri-
tate human respiratory systems, reduce lung function, lead to
increased asthma attacks, reduce crop yields and curtail produc-
tivity in forest ecosystems.5" The FAA and the courts reviewing
the FAA approval of these projects rarely consider the environ-
mental impact of more planes using the runways after airport
expansion projects are completed.
Aircraft engine emissions are regulated by the FAA and the
EPA. 4 Either the FAA or the EPA administrator must approve
testing and sampling methods for aircraft engine emissions and
the administrators of the two agencies are required to consult
with each other.5 5 Regulations limit emissions of carbon mon-
oxide, oxides of nitrogen, and hydrocarbon from aircraft en-
gines.56 These issues are discussed in Section II (E) below.
E. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT, SECTION 4(F)
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1996
prohibits the use of public parks, wildlife refuges, or historically
significant property for transportation projects unless there is
no "prudent and feasible alternative" and "the program or pro-
ject includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the
park. ' 57 The threshold determination is whether the transporta-
tion project will "use" the park. In situations where new roads
are proposed in or near parks, courts have found the use to be
prohibited by Section 4(f).58 Conversely, when faced with a pro-
posal to construct or expand an airport, courts have not found a
About Health Hazards of Engine Emissions, at http://www.lrr:.org/cr/emissions.
html.
52 Control of Air Pollution from Aircraft and Aircraft Engines; Emission Stan-
dards and Test Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,226 (proposed Sept. 30, 2003) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 87).
5S Id. at * 56,233.
54 14 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
55 Id. § 34.3(a).
56 Id. § 34.21.
57 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
58 MatthewJ. Christian, Proliferation and Expansion of America's Airports at the Ex-
pense of its Treasured Parks and Preserves: Judicial Perversion of the Term "Use" in Section
4(l of the Department of Transportation Act, 3 NEV. L.J. 613, 615 (2003).
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"use" sufficient to trigger Section 4(f).59 In one case where a
park had already been impacted by an airport, the court found
the incremental impact of additional flights or an expanded
runway was not significant enough to reject the FAA's plans.6 °
The FAA has determined, and courts have agreed, that the ap-
propriate standard is the incremental impact of the project,
even though cases involving other statutes regulating airport
noise have rejected this approach. 61 This is another way in which
courts have given excessive deference to the FAA at the expense
of the environment. These issues are discussed in Section II (F)
below.
II. AVIATION ACTIVITIES THAT ADVERSELY AFFECT
THE ENVIRONMENT
Aircraft and airports have raised issues involving each of the
above-mentioned federal statutes. Cropdusting, airport expan-
sion, new airport construction, and low-flying aircraft can nega-
tively impact the environment with noise, emissions, polluted
water runoff, and habitat destruction. Each of these impacts will
be discussed below.
A. AERIAL SPRAYING OF PESTICIDES
Liability for spraying pesticides by airplane falls across a wide
spectrum. Some courts deem it an extra-hazardous activity, im-
posing strict liability on the landowner who initiates the spray-
ing.62 Other courts refuse to apply strict liability, requiring a
59 Id.; See also, e.g., Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir.
2001); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 583 (9th Cir.
1998).
60 See, e.g., Save Our Heritage, 269 F.3d at 56. This case also demonstrates the
difficulty plaintiffs face challenging FAA decisions. The Court accorded such a
high degree of deference to the FAA that the court appears to insult the chal-
lenger: "The FAA's final assessment . . . can be overcome by a sustained and
organized rebuttal. Nothing offered by petitioner approaches such an effort.
Gauzy generalizations and pin-prick criticisms, in the face of specific finding and
a plausible result, are not even a start at a serious assault." Id. at 60.
61 See Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 346 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding
that NEPA requires the FAA to consider the cumulative, rather than incremental,
impact of a replacement airport that would add only six additional flights per
day).
62 See Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 566 P.2d 489, 495 (Or. 1977); Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 220 (Wash. 1977); Green v. Zimmerman, 238
S.E.2d 323 (S.C. 1977); see alsoJonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Liability for Injuy
Caused by Spraying or Dusting of Crops, 37 A.L.R. 3D 833 (1971).
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finding of negligence. 63 Some courts have simply imposed liabil-
ity for trespass.64 Regardless of what standard is applied, an
NPDES permit may be required if the jurisdiction considers pes-
ticides to be a pollutant, though this is not a uniform
interpretation.65
An NPDES permit was required in League of Wilderness Defend-
ers/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, where environ-
mental groups challenged the spraying of insecticide over
628,000 acres of national forest.66 The spraying was part of an
annual program aimed at controlling possible outbreaks of the
douglas fir tussock moth.67 The court held that a plane that dis-
charges an insecticide is considered a point source and thus that
an NPDES permit was required.68 The court found the issue of
pesticide drift was not adequately analyzed in the EIS prepared
by the U.S. Forest Service. 69 The EIS provided for mitigation
measures designed to prevent harm to moths and butterflies in
the designated wilderness areas, but did not consider the envi-
ronmental impact on the non-designated wilderness areas.7 °
The drifting of the insecticide could adversely affect aquatic in-
sects, birds, and plants; however, these species were not consid-
ered in the EIS.v" The court held the EIS did not take the
required "hard look" at the environmental effects on the desig-
nated wilderness area.7 2
Regardless of whether an NPDES permit is obtained, land-
owners who damage neighboring property by overspraying may
be liable under theories of trespass, negligence, or strict liabil-
ity.73 In Green v. Zimmerman, a South Carolina court found that
spraying crops adjacent to a fish pond caused the fish to die and
held the owner of the aircraft strictly liable. 4 A Missouri court,
in Watkins v. Johnson, found a crop sprayer liable for damage to
63 See Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984); Burns v. Vaughn, 224
S.W.2d 365 (Ark. 1949).
64 See Cross v. Harris, 370 P.2d 703, 705 (Or. 1962).
65 Purver, supra note 62.
66 League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. For-
sgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1182 (9th Cir. 2002).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1192-93.
69 Id. at 1193.
70 Id. at 1191.
71 Id. at 1183.
72 Id. at 1192.
73 See Purver, supra note 62.
74 Green, 238 S.E.2d at 325.
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his neighbor's clover crop, where spraying was conducted in hot
and windy conditions.7 5 It is inefficient and inconsistent to de-
pend on private landowners to sue for damages for such envi-
ronmental harm. Landowners who cannot afford to sue may
also suffer harm, and, in effect, all people suffer when the envi-
ronment is harmed. Thus, it is not equitable to impose the costs
of suit on any one plaintiff.
By design, pesticides affect the environment by eliminating in-
sects, thus disturbing the natural balance of the ecosystem.
FIFRA and CWA should regulate the use of pesticides more
stringently. Aerial application of pesticides should only be al-
lowed with adequate controls to prevent drift and overspraying.
B. RUNWAY EXPANSION; DESTRUCTION OF HABITAT
Runway expansion may destroy wildlife habitat or introduce
non-native pest species; both effects contravene the policies un-
derlying NEPA and the ESA. The FAA, supported by the courts,
has approved many airport projects without a full consideration
of the impact on wildlife habitat destruction.
1. Airport Construction Projects Approved
The Fourth Circuit denied the state's request for review of a
"FONSI" determination in North Carolina v. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration.76 At the request of the U.S. Navy, the FAA changed
the restricted airspace over eastern North Carolina, expanding
the size of areas used for bombing practice and laser-guided
standoff weapon training.77 The Navy prepared an EIS, which
the FAA reviewed, before issuing a FONSI.78 The FAA planned
to address the cumulative impact of this and other nearby mili-
tary airspace changes in another EIS. 79 Although the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") had identified threatened and en-
dangered species nearby, the court deemed sufficient the Navy's
response to realign the restricted airspace away from the shore-
line.8° Less habitat would be destroyed if the FAA were required
to obtain the approval of the FWS before making its
determinations.
75 Watkins v. Johnson, 606 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
76 North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1992).
77 Id. at 1129.
78 Id. at 1130.
79 Id. at 1131.
80 Id. at 1134.
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Similar to the North Carolina case, the limited input of the
FWS was not sufficient to control runway expansion in Hawaii.81
Environmental organizations unsuccessfully argued that the
FAA violated NEPA by failing to analyze the impact of a runway
expansion project on the introduction of non-indigenous spe-
cies into Hawaii. 2 The Ninth Circuit determined that the FAA
took the required "hard look" at the consequences of the pro-
posed project and thus that the EIS satisfied NEPA require-
ments." In determining whether the FAA adequately analyzed
the effects of the expansion project, the court stated that it need
not necessarily agree with the FAA's conclusions, but instead
must be satisfied that the EIS "fostered informed decision-mak-
ing and public participation. ' 84 The EIS included data on the
impact of international flight arrivals, including significant dis-
cussion of the uncertain impact of alien species. 8 5 The FAA did
request an opinion from the FWS and a panel of biology experts
chosen by the FAA.86 The FWS determined that the proposed
project was "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered, threatened or proposed endangered spe-
cies."8" This would be cold comfort for any species not yet iden-
tified as threatened or for an endangered species significantly
harmed, but not in a manner that jeopardized its continued ex-
istence. The opinion of the FAA's biologic assessment panel was
even more frightening, finding "no one can predict which alien
species might be introduced.., due to the proposed project. 88
Continuing such a project when experts cannot predict the po-
tential harm posed by alien species to native species is evidence
of a lack of environmental concern. The FAA opinion should
have made it easy for the court to find FAA approval of the pro-
posed project to be arbitrary and capricious, but it did not. The
dissent noted that yearly non-stop flights from Asia, which were
not possible before the proposed project, would now number
1100, greatly increasing the risk of introducing Asian species of
pests.8 9 The sensitive nature of the Hawaiian biological hotspot
81 See Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 222
F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2000).
82 Id. at 678-79.
83 Id. at 682.
84 Id. at 680.
85 Id. at 680-81.
86 Id. at 679.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 686.
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was not given adequate regard by the court or the FAA.90 There
are species native to Hawaii that exist nowhere else on the
planet, and the harm from a non-native pest or disease could be
devastating and irreversible.9 1
Unlike the uncertainty in the Hawaii case, destruction of
habitat was certain in an Alaska airport expansion case.92 How-
ever, the court found nothing lacking in an EIS that made no
mention of the potential impact on local wildlife. The Su-
preme Court of Alaska affirmed a review by the Division of Gov-
ernmental Coordination under the Alaska Coastal Management
Program. 4 That agency approved a plan which, as submitted to
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under the CWA, permitted
Anchorage International Airport to dredge 240 acres of wet-
lands.95 Although there was no discussion of the species inhab-
iting the wetlands, the court found that the EIS "did not fail to
consider any important factors."96 If the EPA or FWS had been
involved, those agencies might have convinced the court other-
wise. Two hundred and forty acres of wetlands certainly con-
tained numerous species of wildlife, and wetlands play an
important role in filtering water pollutants.
In another case involving wetlands filling, the court found
that the Army Corps of Engineers' approval of the Port of Seat-
tle's plan to fill in fifty wetlands was not arbitrary and capri-
cious.9 7 The case involved construction of an 8,500-foot third
runway at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, which
would require 23.64 million cubic yards of fill.9" Despite evi-
dence that the acreage of the wetlands was underreported, and
that the Corps' decided to require only one-hundred-foot buffer
zones around the impacted wetlands, instead of the 15,100-foot
buffers recommended by FWS, the court deferred to the Corps
decision.99 A later case brought by opponents of the same air-
port project was also decided in favor of the project, finding that
90 For an excellent discussion of the importance of biological hotspots, see gen-
erally JOHN CHARLES KUNICH, ARK OF THE BROKEN COVENANT: PROTECTING THE
WORLD's BIODIVERsrry HOTSPOTS (Praeger 2003).
91 Id.
92 Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. State, 80 P.3d 231, 249-50 (Alaska 2003).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 255.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Airport Cmtys. Coalition v. Graves, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
98 Id. at 1211.
99 Id. at 1227.
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there was "reasonable assurance" that the project would comply
with state water quality standards.1 0 There was no discussion of
the species that would be adversely affected by the filling-in of
Miller Creek and the fifty separate wetlands. 101 As previously
stated, if the FWS were required to approve this project, the re-
sult might have been different, and the wetlands and their in-
habitants saved.
Involvement of the FWS does not guarantee a more environ-
mentally favorable result. In National Wildlife Federation v. Norton,
the court found that the incidental take permit the FWS issued
to airport park developers would not jeopardize survival of the
fourteen species expected to be impacted by the develop-
ment.10 2 An incidental take permit is an acknowledgement by
the FWS that particular endangered or threatened animals may
be killed.10 3 The proposed project would encompass nearly
2,000 acres of agricultural land adjacent to the Sacramento In-
ternational Airport."0 The proposal was for the construction of
offices, hotels, a golf course, and other improvements incidental
to the airport. 0 At the time of the suit, the land was fallow;
however, it once provided valuable habitat for the Giant Garter
Snake and Swainson's Hawk, which were listed as threatened
under the Federal and California Endangered Species Acts, re-
spectively.'06 The developer's mitigation plan provided for the
acquisition of 1,200 acres of land to be conserved as alternate
habitat, only 25% of which would be in the same county, and
none of it was required to be adjacent to the development
site.107 Proximity of the alternative site to the habitat destroyed
is critical to allow the individual members of the species to seek
refuge in the new site.10 8 In fact, none of the alternative land
had actually been identified. 9 The petitioners claimed that the
issuance of the take permit was arbitrary and capricious because:
(1) there was inadequate evidence that the authorized take
would notjeopardize survival of the species; (2) there was inade-
100 Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 90 P.3d 659, 665 (Wash.
2004).
101 See id. at 691-92.
102 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Norton, 306 F. Supp. 2d 920, 921 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
103 Id. at 924.
104 Id. at 921.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 921-22.
107 Id. at 922.
108 Id. at 926.
109 Id. at 925.
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quate funding available for the plan; and (3) there was no dem-
onstration that the plan mitigated the harm to the "maximum
extent practicable."'1 0 The court deferred to the findings of the
FWS, allowing the airport park development project to
continue."
Endangered species were similarly ignored in a case involving
construction of a new airport near Denver,1 2 although no ESA
cause of action was alleged by the petitioners. The D.C. Circuit
affirmed an FAA decision to build the new airport, notwith-
standing that it would be near a wildlife refuge with at least one
known pair of nesting bald eagles." 3 The petitioners based their
claims on Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation
Act.1 1 4 Once again, deference was not appropriate where the
FAA was making decisions outside its area of expertise, and
where the FWS was not involved in the decision. Courts should
deem any EIS to be arbitrary and capricious if the FWS has not
approved the proposed action.
2. Airport Projects Halted Because of Environmental Concerns
The California Northern District Court has been somewhat
more environmentally friendly, at least demanding that a full
EIS be prepared, and finding that a FONSI determination was
not reasonable where environmental factors had not been given
due consideration. 15 In California v. United States Department of
Transportation, the court granted a joint motion for summary
judgment by the state and environmental organizations against
the FAA, finding that the FAA's FONSI determination was un-
reasonable.1 1 6 The FAA had not prepared an EIS, although
there was concern that the airport expansion project would im-
pact the sage grouse and that it was possible that birds would be
struck by aircraft. 7 The FAA also failed to adequately analyze
the cumulative impact of increased numbers of visitors to
Yosemite National Park, including the impact on affected spe-
110 Id. at 924.
-l Id. at 929.
112 Allison v. United States Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 260 F. Supp. 2d 969,
973-74 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 971, n.1.
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cies of wildlife, noise levels, and air quality."a 8 The court found
that whether a project causes a significant effect on the environ-
ment requires evaluating the interests affected and the degree
to which those interests will be affected, including "considera-
tion of factors such as the controversial nature of the project,
the cumulative impacts of the project, and the degree to which
the project may impact endangered or threatened species." '119
Because the FAA ignored these concerns, the California Depart-
ment of Fish and Game concluded that the information con-
tained in the Environmental Assessment ("EA") was inadequate
to support the FONSI, and the court agreed. 2 °
The same court similarly required that environmental con-
cerns be more thoroughly analyzed in an earlier case where it
vacated a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers that
would have allowed the filling of 180 acres of wetlands.1 21 The
Oakland Airport planned to build additional cargo space, with
parking and other facilities, and requested permits to fill one
375-acre plot and another 435-acre plot of wetlands.1 22 The
Army Corps of Engineers approved a project of a reduced size,
determining that no EIS was required because the 180-acre fill
would have no significant environmental impact. 12 The diked,
nontidal baylands provided feeding and resting habitat for mi-
gratory shorebirds and waterfowl during the winter, as well as
year-round habitat for other birds and wildlife.' 24 At least two
endangered species, the salt marsh harvest mouse and the Cali-
fornia least tern, were thought to inhabit the area.1 25 In addi-
tion, the wetlands filtered pollutants from run-off that drained
into the San Francisco Bay, and this function would be damaged
by the proposed plan.' 26 The court found that the Army Corps
of Engineers did not effectively evaluate these impacts in deter-
118 Id. at 974-75. See also Shelby Angel, Airport Expansion - Costs vs. Environmental
Damage When Expanding Airport Facilities - The Eighth Circuit Holds that all Reasona,
ble Alternative Solutions Need Not Be Explained In Great Detail In the FAA 's Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement - City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1009
(2002).
119 California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 260 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (citations
omitted).
120 Id. at 973-74.
121 People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh, 687 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
122 Id. at 497.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 499.
126 Id. at 500.
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mining that no EIS was required and issued an injunction until
the Corps investigated further. 127 Although the court acknowl-
edged that NEPA is essentially procedural, 128 the court used the
statute to ensure that the potential environmental harm was
given due consideration.
Other courts should follow the precedent of the California
Northern District Court in harnessing the unfettered discretion
of the FAA. Courts should find any EIS or FONSI to be arbitrary
and capricious if the harm to wildlife is not adequately analyzed
and if the prevention of harm to wildlife is not given priority,
particularly where endangered or threatened species are in-
volved. Although courts are prohibited from substituting their
judgment for the agency's decision, courts must support the
congressional intent to protect the environment, as evidenced
by the CAA, ESA, and CWA. Any FAA decision that impairs
habitat of wild animals, where the decision is made without con-
sultation with and the approval of the FWS, should be deemed
arbitrary and capricious.
C. NoisE POLLUTION
Courts and airports have been struggling with the problem of
noise pollution since 1946, when the U.S. Supreme Court de-
clared that a chicken farmer was entitled to compensation for a
taking of his property because aircraft departing and arriving at
an adjoining airfield disturbed his chickens. 129 The Department
of Transportation estimated that excessive aircraft noise was a
significant annoyance for as many as seven million Americans by
1976.130 Congress responded to these concerns by enacting the
Airport Noise and Capacity Act (ANCA), and providing incen-
tives for airport operators to manage noise.' However, this act
has been thwarted by the FAA. The FAA has taken the position
that it has the authority to review, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, all noise restrictions, and to sanction airport proprie-
tors for breach of contract, suspending federal grant funds
where the FAA has found the noise restrictions to be discrimina-
127 Id. at 501.
128 Id. at 498.
129 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
130 NORMAN ASHFORD & PAUL H. WRIGHT, AIRPORT ENGINEERING 485 (1992)
(citing Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, United States Dept. of Transportation,
Nov. 18, 1976).
131 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521-533 (2000).
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tory toward certain types of aircraft.1 1 2 As a result, the ANCA
has had minimal impact in reducing noise pollution. This leaves
plaintiffs with the alternatives of nuisance claims or NEPA
challenges.
In Town of Cave Creek v. Federal Aviation Administration,133 the
D.C. Circuit Court deferred to an FAA decision that no EIS was
required, although the petitioners alleged harmful noise pollu-
tion would result from air traffic re-routing. Petitioners claimed
that the proposed changes to the high-altitude arrival and de-
parture procedures at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International
Airport would cause planes to fly over two Native American res-
ervations.1 34 A court's standard, when reviewing an agency's
FONSI on the environment, is limited to the following inquiries:
whether the agency has (1) "identified the relevant environmen-
tal concern;" (2) taken a "hard look" in preparing the environ-
mental assessment; and (3) made a convincing case that there
will be no significant impact.1 5
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit also affirmed an FAA FONSI deci-
sion in Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc. v. United States, where a
neighborhood group alleged that the upgrade of a runway at
the Albuquerque International Airport would have a cumulative
impact on noise and safety. 13 6 In addition to the runway up-
grade, the city's master plan for the airport included expansion
of the passenger terminal, construction of a new cargo terminal
and parking structure, and expansion of access roads over a
twenty-year period. 137 In deferring to the FAA decision, the
court found that the cumulative impact of the entire master
plan need not be considered in creating an EIS because it was
possible to expand the runway without completing all other
projects proposed in the master plan. 38
The Tenth Circuit affirmed an FAA decision to provide air-
space for military training, and found the EIS to be satisfac-
tory.13 9  The court emphasized that NEPA "prohibits
132 See Peter D. Irvine, The Future of Stage 2 Airport Noise Restrictions: A Matter of
Substantive Versus Procedural Review by the Federal Aviation Administration, 11 GEo.
MASON L. REv. 179, 194-203 (2002).
133 Town of Cave Creek v. FAA, 325 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
134 Id. at 325.
135 Id. at 327.
136 Airport Neighbors Alliance, Inc. v. United States, 90 F.3d 426, 427-28 (10th
Cir. 1996).
137 Id. at 428.
138 Id. at 431.
139 Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001).
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uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action. ' 140 The EIS ana-
lyzed the "natural quiet" of the area as a resource"4 but con-
cluded that the impact of the proposal would be negligible. 142
This level of deference by the courts encourages the FAA to ig-
nore harmful environmental effects, including noise pollution.
So long as the FAA analyzes the harm that will occur, courts
have sanctioned the FAA's decision. This is a mockery of the
Administrative Procedure Act requirement that agency deci-
sions must be overturned if a court finds such decision to be
arbitrary and capricious. 14 3
In City of Bridgeton v. FAA, the Eighth Circuit denied a petition
to review an FAA decision to expand an airport, notwithstanding
the EIS's failure to measure whether aircraft noise would inter-
fere with events in a historic district and park and not with-
standing the destruction of five irreplaceable historic sites."4
The court found that the regulations required only that airport
operators "measure in decibels the yearly day-night average
noise level at various points near the airport"145 and if the
choice of alternatives is not arbitrary or capricious, it will be up-
held.146 This standard places a heavy burden on those who chal-
lenge FAA decisions, even though the FAA has no expertise on
the emotional impact that loud noises can have on people and
their enjoyment of a historic park.
A federal district court in Texas found that a hard look was
sufficient, notwithstanding admitted impact on wildlife and peo-
ple, in Welch v. United States Air Force.147 Landowners brought suit
under NEPA, challenging the Air Force's plan to train combat
bomber aircrews in the air space over their farms and
ranches. 4 ' The Air Force chose to designate airspace for these
purposes, although it predicted the increase in noise level would
increase the percentage of "highly annoyed" persons by eight
percent.'49 The aircraft would fly over state parks and scenic
140 Id. at 1034 (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 1036.
142 Id. at 1038.
143 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
144 City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2000).
145 Id. at 460
146 Id. at 461-62.
147 Welch, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 797, remanded by Davis Mountains Trans Pecos
Heritage Ass'n v. FAA, Nos. 02-60288, 03-10506, 03-10528, 2004 WL 225986 (5th
Cir. Oct. 12, 2004); see supra text accompanying note 25.
148 Id. at 801.
149 Id. at 802.
728
UNDUE DEFERENCE TO FAA EXPERTISE
rivers and the historic range of the Aplomado falcon would be
potentially disturbed.1"' The Air Force admitted that injuries to
startled livestock were possible. 151 The Air Force intended to
compensate those ranchers harmed by the loss of livestock.1 5 2
The court found that NEPA requires only that the Air Force re-
port acknowledge potential harm to livestock and other species
and the potential adverse effects on the underlying area, so that
the final decision-maker had adequate information to make an
informed decision.15 ' Because the Air Force consulted with the
FWS and requested lists of endangered species, the district court
found that this constituted a sufficient "hard look," regardless of
the resulting impact. 154 Obtaining a list of endangered species
in the area is not sufficient; the FWS was not asked to evaluate
the project and its opinion was not part of the EIS. 5 5 The Fifth
Circuit re-evaluated this case when it was consolidated with two
other cases on appeal.1 56 The Fifth Circuit affirmed that the EIS
sufficiently addressed environmental impact to livestock, but or-
dered a supplemental EIS to address the economic impact of
low-level flights over the ranches. 157
Similarly, a hard look was all that was required in Lee v. United
States Air Force, where the court held that an EIS was adequate
because it addressed a proposed project's impact on livestock,
noise, land values, culture, and civil aviation; noted the cumula-
tive effects of foreseeable actions; and offered alternative ac-
tions. 158 Although the EIS used some studies that dated back
more than twenty years, the court found no violation of the re-
quirement that the agency use the "best available scientific infor-
mation. '' 15' The EIS acknowledged that the low-flying aircraft
"may or may not lead to livestock damage," notwithstanding
public hearing testimony that horses startled by noise had suf-
fered fatal injuries when they ran over a fence in response to the
aircraft noise, that people were injured by startled horses, and
that other livestock had been harmed.1 60 The court found the
150 Id.
151 Id. at 836.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 838.
154 Id. at 850.
155 Id. at 848.
156 Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass'n, 2004 WL 2295986.
157 Id. at *3, *10.
158 Lee v. United States Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2004).
159 Id. at 1244.
160 Id.
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decision to expand the airport was not arbitrary nor capri-
cious.' This is another example of the lack of importance ac-
corded to environmental harm, and the lack of meaningful
review by the courts.
Courts have been somewhat more protective of the impact of
aviation noise pollution on popular national parks. In several
recent cases, the circuit courts have taken a closer look at the
FAA statistics, and found them insufficient. 162 Where Congress
has specifically sought to protect our national parks from air-
craft noise, the FAA has faced tougher scrutiny of its decisions.
In an effort to limit aircraft noise impact on the Grand Canyon,
Congress required the Secretary of the Interior to submit to the
FAA recommendations for restoration of the natural quiet at
Grand Canyon National Park.1 63 The FAA interpreted this goal
to mean that 50% or more of the park should experience natu-
ral quiet for 75-100% of the day as an annual average. 64 The
court found this standard to be unreasonable and contrary to
the intent of the statute, because the average park visitor does
not visit on an average annual day, but on a busy summer day,
and will not benefit from an average with quieter off-season
days. '65 If the Eighth Circuit had similarly rejected the use of an
annual average noise level in City of Bridgeton, discussed in sec-
tion II(C) above, the airport expansion may have been cur-
tailed. 166 The FAA only accounted for noise from tour aircraft,
not from commercial jets, general, or military flights.167 The sta-
tistics gathered by the National Park Service indicated a signifi-
cant number of commercial and general aviation flights created
noise, in addition to the noise from the air tours that were the
subject of the suit. 68 Because the FAA ignored flights other than
air tours in its calculations, the court remanded the case for fur-
ther FAA study. 69 The court's scrutiny of the FAA standard in
this case should encourage other courts to refrain from defer-
ring to FAA decisions that are outside the FAA's expertise. FAA
161 Id.
162 See, e.g., United States Air Tour Ass'n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Nat'l Parks and Con-
servation Ass'n v. FAA, 998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993).
163 16 U.S.C. § 7a (2000).
164 United States Air Tour Ass'n, 298 F.3d at 1004.
165 Id.
166 See City of Bridgeton v. FAA, 212 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2000).
167 United States Air Tour Ass'n, 298 F.3d at 1004.
168 Id. at 1019.
169 Id.
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decisions directly related to aviation safety are entitled to defer-
ence, but FAA determinations regarding the effect of noise on
humans or livestock are not.
In another case involving a popular national park, the court
required preparation of an EIS to determine the cumulative im-
pact of increased noise levels in Zion National Park, overturning
the FAA's FONSI determination.170 The FAA had looked only at
the incremental impact of the noise, in violation of NEPA regu-
lations.17 ' The FAA used a weighted decibel scale to account for
the differing impact of night-time noise levels and the impact of
different sound frequencies, measured as "dBA."'172 The FAA de-
termined that the ambient noise level in Zion National Park was
twenty dBA.'17 The maximum noise level from the proposed
new airport was estimated at forty-five to sixty-five dBA, where an
increase of ten dBA "correlates to a doubling of loudness such
that a commercial jet overflight at the Park may be 4 to 23 times
as loud as the natural soundscape.' 1 74 The FAA had admitted in
its Environmental Assessment that two to eight percent of park
visitors would experience "moderate to extreme annoyance"
from the additional flights.175 It is not clear why the court took
the unusual step of questioning the scientific findings of the
FAA in this case, but other courts should be encouraged to do
likewise.
In an earlier case where opponents of noise levels were some-
what successful, the Second Circuit dissolved a ban on super-
sonic transport flights that prohibited the Concorde from
landing atJohn F. Kennedy International Airport.176 The court
found that the Port Authority could not ban Concorde flights
indefinitely based on inconclusive studies on the effect of the
supersonic jet's low frequency emissions. 77 But the court found
that the Port Authority could adopt a "new, uniform and reason-
able noise standard" in the future if it could show that the cur-
rent standard is inadequate. 78 In the concurrence, Judge
Mansfield noted that there were 1,387 complaints about the
170 Grand Canyon Trust, 290 F.3d 339.
171 Id. at 345.
172 Id. at 343, nn.1,2.
173 Id. at 344.
174 Id. at 345.
175 Id. at 344.
176 British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.
1977).
177 Id. at 1011-12.
178 Id. at 1012-13.
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Concorde's noise during the one year it operated out of Dulles,
although only 1,000 people resided in the area.179
Faced with the extreme deference of the federal courts, oppo-
nents of airport expansion have found hope in state and local
laws. Courts have held that, although the FAA has exclusive ju-
risdiction over aviation safety concerns and use of airspace, envi-
ronmental impact and land use are matters of local concern and
are not preempted.' ° This jurisdiction is limited, however, to
the location of airports and local permit requirements and can-
not impact the operating hours of an airport.'' The operating
hours of an airport were at issue in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc.'12 The Supreme Court held that a city ordinance
that prohibited jet aircraft from taking off at Hollywood-Bur-
bank Airport between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. was inva-
lid as preempted by the FAA. 8 The court hinted that a
municipality that owned and operated an airport may be able to
impose such noise or curfew restrictions in its capacity as propri-
etor of the airport."8 4 This dicta gave support to the City of New
York when, acting as proprietor, it restricted sightseeing flights
from a seaplane base.18 5 The court upheld the restriction, find-
ing no preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act, 186 and find-
ing that the restriction was not an unreasonable or arbitrary
attempt to curb noise pollution in the city.' 87
Noise pollution will continue to be a problem as populations
encroach upon formerly isolated airports. New airports should
be constructed in less environmentally sensitive areas, and more
efficient use should be made of existing airports. Courts should
not defer to FAA determinations regarding the impact of in-
creased noise levels on humans and wildlife. The FAA's exper-
tise is limited to aviation safety, and the deference given to the
FAA should be limited accordingly. It is dangerous to rely on the
FAA to make reasonable determinations in a subject about
which it admits to knowing very little.
179 Id. at 1016.
180 See, e.g., In re Commercial Airfield, 752 A.2d 13 (Vt. 2000); City of Cleve-
land, Ohio v. City of Brook Park, Ohio, 893 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
18, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 635, n.14.
185 See SeaAir NY, Inc. v. City of New York, 250 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2001).
186 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2000).
187 SeaAir NY, Inc., 250 F.3d at 186-87.
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D. DE-ICING RUNOFF
Accumulations of ice on a plane's wing and tail surfaces can
increase drag, decrease lift, and restrict control. Ice accumula-
tion in the engine air intakes can result in engine failure. Icing
is a factor in a significant number of aircraft accidents.' Ice
and snow on runways are a hazard in take-off and landing opera-
tions. Antifreeze-type solutions containing propylene or ethy-
lene glycol and urea are commonly used as anti-icing agents to
prevent ice and snow from adhering to aircraft, and as de-icing
agents to remove ice and snow.8 9 These chemicals are noxious
to aquatic life. Ethylene glycol is toxic to mammals, including
humans, and can cause neurological, cardiovascular, and gastro-
intestinal problems, severe birth defects, and death. 9 ° As of Au-
gust 2000, the EPA estimated that twenty-one million gallons of
aircraft de-icing fluid (ADF) were discharged into surface waters
per year. 9' If effluent limitations guidelines and standards sug-
gested by the EPA were implemented, the EPA estimates that
this figure could be reduced by more than 80%, to four million
gallons.1 92 In August 2000, the General Accounting Office
ranked water quality second after noise as the most important
environmental issue raised by airport operations.' ADF de-
pletes water of oxygen as it biodegrades, resulting in the death
of fish and other aquatic life.' 94 Although airports that discharge
ADF into navigable waterways must obtain an NPDES permit,'95
there are no limits on the amount that can be discharged and
no federal controls on which chemical combination is used. Fil-
tration, recovery, recapture, and treatment of the contaminated
runoff water are not required. Non-chemical mechanical alter-
188 William L. Maynard & Wayne R. Sand, The State of the Art Knowledge For Icing
Accidents for General Aviation Aircraft, 65J. AIR L. & COM. 719 (2000).
189 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SOURCE WATER PRO-
TECTION PRACTICES BULLETIN, MANAGING AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELD DEICING OPERA-
TIONS TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION OF DRINKING WATER, EPA 816-F-02-018, (Aug.
2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/protect/pdfs/airporftfs.pdf
[hereinafter Bulletin].
190 Id.
191 UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY,
AIRPORT DEICING OPERATIONS (REVISED), EPA-821-R-00-016, at 1-4 (August 2002),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/guide/airport/airport.pdf..
192 Id.
193 General Accounting Office, "Aviation and the Environment," August 2000.
194 See, e.g., Buchholz v. Dayton Int'l Airport, No.C-3-94-435, 1995 WL 811897
at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 1995).
195 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b) (14) (viii) (2004).
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natives have not been fully explored, such as the use of heat to
melt the ice and snow.
The harm caused by these chemicals was evident in Buchholz v.
Dayton International Airport.19 6 A stormwater discharge basin was
draining ADF into a creek that ran through the plaintiff's prop-
erty.197 The pollution resulted in over 2,000 dead fish, a discol-
oration of the creek, glycol odors, and foaming of the water. 9
The airport had obtained an NPDES permit, which authorized a
discharge of pollutants from seven identifiable points, so long as
the effluent was in amounts that would not "impair designated
stream uses."'199 The airport admitted that discharges from its
stormwater system caused the foaming, discoloration, and odors
and took steps to remedy the situation, including persuading
tenants of the airport to use less harmful de-icing fluids. 20 0 The
court issued a preliminary injunction, and found that "Dayton's
handling and storage of solid wastes ... have resulted in actual
harm to the aquatic life of the Mill Creek, the possible contami-
nation of local drinking water wells with ethylene glycol, and
actual, albeit minor and transitory, acute health effects on per-
sons."20 1 The injunctive relief granted by the court was merely a
continuation of the remedial action already taken by the airport
to improve the situation.2 °2
This source of water pollution can be alleviated through the
use of less harmful chemicals like sodium formate or through
the use of heat and air to remove the snow and ice. The FAA
should require the use of less harmful chemicals, and should
require recovery and treatment of contaminated water.
E. EMISSIONS - AIR POLLUTION
The FAA contends that there is "no known cause and effect
relationship between airplane emissions and human health" and
therefore the Fourth Circuit has found it reasonable for the FAA
not to study these effects further and to omit such effects from
196 Buchholz, 1995 WL 811897.
197 Id. at *4.
198 Id. at *7.
199 Id. at *8.
200 Id. at *13.
201 Id. at *24
202 Id. at *24-26.
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an EIS. 2°3 The findings of the EPA, described in Section I (D)
above, are in direct conflict with this statement.
In City of Olmsted Falls v. Federal Aviation Administration, the city
argued that the FAA failed to adequately disclose and analyze in
its EIS the air quality impact of a proposed project to expand
Cleveland Hopkins International Airport.20 4 The air quality anal-
ysis omitted the air quality impact of twenty-one construction
projects used in the expansion master plan, as well as the impact
of the additional air traffic attracted by the increased capacity of
the runways.20 5 The FAA reported the air quality impact would
be de minimis. 20 6 The brief mention of these construction
projects in the EIS, with the conclusion that the projects would
be completed regardless of the approval of the airport master
plan, was deemed by the court to be adequate disclosure. 20 7 The
court also found that the city had waived its Clean Air Act claims
by failing to challenge the project at the FAA hearing. 208 Addi-
tionally, the court found that the city did not prove that the
emissions from these projects necessarily would undermine the
FAA's de minimis determination, only that the possibility ex-
isted.20 9 While deference ought to be given to the FAA's findings
concerning airfield capacity and demand, the same level of def-
erence should not be given to the FAA's determinations of air
quality impact.
The de minimis exception allows the emission of noxious va-
pors so long as the increase in projected emissions is de minimis
compared to emission levels without the proposed project.210
The problem is that the FAA determines what the emission
levels would be both with and without the proposed project.
Most challenges to these findings fail. The EPA sets forth the
criteria for the de minimis exception in 40 C.F.R. § 93.153, pro-
viding that the air quality impact of "routine maintenance" of
runways need not be determined.21 ' This exception does not ap-
ply to larger projects, such as runway expansion.212 However,
203 See Alliance for Legal Action v. FAA, No.02-1062, 2003 WL 21546006 at *6
(4th Cir. July 10, 2003).
204 City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 271.
207 Id. at 270.
208 Id. at 271.
209 Id. at 271-72.
210 Id. at 270.
211 Id. at 272.
212 Id.
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the court held that the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport
project was merely a runway relocation, not an expansion (not-
withstanding that one runway would be extended 2,250 feet).213
The court noted that the EPA merely suggests that the de
minimis exception should not apply to runway expansions be-
cause they are larger projects. 214 The court denied the petition
for review of the FAA decision.215 This is another example of
how the courts create numerous hurdles for any petitioner who
challenges the FAA.
In City of Tempe v. Federal Aviation Administration, the court
found a lack of sufficient evidence of irreparable harm resulting
from a runway expansion despite potential damage to city build-
ings and citizen health due to increased emissions from a run-
way expansion project.216 Denying an injunction to stop the
project, the court agreed with the FAA that the project came
within the de minimis exception for repair projects. 217 Other
Clean Air Act (CAA) challenges to FAA airport projects have
similarly failed because petitioners were unable to overcome the
burden of the court's deference to the FAA.2 1
8
The Administrators of the FAA and the EPA are required to
consult with each other before either approves a testing proce-
dure or process inconsistent with the emissions regulations and
to determine whether such action requires rulemaking. 219 This
enforced collaboration between the EPA and the FAA should be
approved more extensively to regulations that protect the envi-
ronment from the harmful effects of aviation.
F. IMPACT ON NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE REFUGES
Noise is the primary impact of aviation on national parks and
wildlife refuges. As discussed above, Congress attempted to
limit this impact by enacting Section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act of 1996,220 prohibiting the use of parks for
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 273.
216 City of Tempe v. FAA, 239 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2003).
217 Id. at 60.
218 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. FAA, 138 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
that a terminal expansion project fell under a CAA grandfather clause); Conser-
vation Law Found. Inc. v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that NEPA
violation did not adversely affect determination of CAA compliance based on
conformation with state implementation plan).
219 14 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
220 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000).
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transportation projects. 2 21 But this has not been effective be-
cause no court has ever found that an airport "uses" a park, as
defined by the statute.2 2 In City of Grapevine v. Department of
Transportation, the court denied review of an FAA determina-
tion that an expansion of the Dallas/Fort Worth International
Airport would not "use" nearby historic residential properties. 223
The FAA guidelines provide that recreational areas are "used" if
the noise level exceeds seventy average day and night sound
level measurements. 224 The plaintiffs argued that the FAA guide-
lines were not the appropriate measure because they were devel-
oped for land use and funding decisions, not for purposes of
Section 4(f) .225 The court found the FAA was not arbitrary in
following its own guidelines. 226 The plaintiffs also argued that
the FAA should not have applied the standard for residential
properties because historic sites could be more sensitive to
noise.227 The court found that the historic sites were in daily use
as residences, and there was no reason to find that the residen-
tial standard was inappropriate simply because the sites were
also historic.228 This adverse impact on historic properties is
precisely the type of harm that Section 4(f) was intended to pre-
vent; however, the FAA was allowed to thwart its effect.
A later case similarly trivialized the impact of noise on historic
sites. In Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration,
the FAA authorized commercial flights operating out of Han-
scom Field, a small general aviation airport in the suburbs of
Boston.229 The First Circuit agreed with the FAA that the addi-
tion of seven to ten round trip flights of a fifty-passenger turbo-
prop commuter plane per day was de minimis and trivial, and
would not be a constructive use of the nearby historic parks.23 °
The main access road to the airport runs through Minute Man
National Historic Park, and the airport is close to Walden Pond
and the historic homes of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Louisa
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp.,
222 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2000).
223 City of Grapevine v. United States Dep't of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1507-08
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
224 Id. at 1507.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1508.
228 Id.
229 See Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 58-60 (1st Cir. 2001).
230 Id.
2004] 737
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
May Alcott. 23 ' The court denied petitioners' request for review,
finding a 2.5% total annual increase in the number of flights to
be trivial and ignoring the difference between the small general
aviation plane that comprised the bulk of the existing flights
and the large turboprops proposed, as well as the objections of
the four surrounding towns.23 2
In another decision finding no "use" of a park, the D.C. Cir-
cuit agreed with the FAA that airport noise would not "use" Barr
Lake State Park, a recreational park and wildlife refuge.233 Even
though the court admitted that the wrong standard for noise
impact had been used by the FAA, the court found that this er-
ror was not prejudicial. 23 4 This park was particularly sensitive to
noise because at least one pair of bald eagles was known to nest
in the park, and the park was widely known for its waterfowl.235
Although the petitioners argued that the park would be "used"
by noise as well as air pollution, the court limited its discussion
to the noise impact. 236 The FAA found that the anticipated noise
of the new airport would be insignificant according to the guide-
lines created by the FAA.237 The guidelines did not have a sepa-
rate standard for wildlife refuges, so the FAA applied its
guidelines for noise impact on nature exhibits, parks and golf
courses. 238 The court found that the standard was not appropri-
ate because the focus of the guideline was the noise impact on
people rather than the impact on wildlife. 2 9 The FAA argued
that "studies on the reaction of animals to aircraft noise have
been inconclusive at best. '240 Although the court found the
guideline was inappropriately applied, it determined that this
FAA error was not prejudicial and therefore affirmed FAA ap-
proval.241 The court relied on the FAA's determination that the
noise impact of the proposed airport on the refuge would not
be significantly greater than the noise impact of the existing air-
231 Id. at 53.
232 Id. at 58.
233 See Allison v. United States Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
234 Id. at 1026.
235 Id. at 1028.
236 Id.
237 Id.
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port being replaced, Stapleton International Airport.242 The
FAA concluded in its EIS that portions of the refuge would be
subjected to approximately five minutes per day of noise in ex-
cess of the noise equivalent of a household vacuum cleaner op-
erating five feet away.24 3 Because some portions of the park
would experience a decrease in noise levels when the new air-
port replaced the existing one, the court agreed with the FAA
conclusion that the refuge would not be "used. ' 244 This case il-
lustrates the difficulty petitioners face in showing that noise
levels of a new project will be significantly worse than the cur-
rent situation because so many of our parks are already affected
by noise. The current laws do not seek to improve the situation,
only to preserve the status quo.
In an unusual case finding a decision of the FAA to be arbi-
trary and capricious, the Tenth Circuit made a valiant effort to
restrain the FAA.245 The court found that an FAA determination
of no significant impact on Glen Canyon was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 246 The EIS prepared by the FAA indicated that both the
number of aircraft heard by recreational users of the park, as
well as the level of audibility of the aircraft, would double.247
Notwithstanding this estimate, the FAA concluded that the air-
port would have no significant impact on the area, providing
empirical evidence to support its conclusion.24' The FAA rested
on the defense that its determination of no significant impact
was a technical determination within FAA discretion. 249 The
court disagreed, remanding the case for further FAA action.25 °
However, the airport had already been built and was in full op-
eration, and the park had already suffered the damage. 25' The
court noted that under Section 4(f), if the FAA found a signifi-
cant impact, the FAA would be required to take all reasonable
steps to mitigate the damage.252 It would be a challenge to find a
more obvious case of locking the barn door after the horse
escaped.
242 Id. at 1030.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1031.
245 SeeNat' Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. FAA, 998 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1992).
246 Id. at 1533.
247 Id. at 1532.




252 Id. at 1534.
2004] 739
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
III. STRATEGIES TO MINIMIZE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
The FAA has been given broad powers and wide discretion
which must not be abused. If the courts do not harness the
FAA, the FAA should police itself to ensure that prevention of
environmental harm is given its rightful priority. Courts should
use the statutes enacted by Congress to ensure that the FAA's
power is restricted appropriately. Pilots and airport owners can
play a significant role in minimizing the environmental harm.
Joint approval of the EPA, the FWS, and the FAA should be re-
quired for new airport projects. Improved information and data
systems among the agencies involved would result in a more co-
ordinated effort to minimize environmental harm. Pollution
taxes or fines should be imposed on violators, and permits to
pollute could be exchanged among aviation providers. The re-
sponsibility for environmental harm should be shared with de-
signers, producers, suppliers, and users of aircraft.
A. CROP DUSTING
Pilots can play a significant role in ensuring that pesticides
sprayed from airplanes do not overspray the intended area and
result in pollution of water or harm to neighboring flora or
fauna. Landowners should chose pesticides that are environ-
mentally less harmful. The FAA should impose more strict regu-
lation on the aerial application of pesticides. Courts should
impose strict liability for harm caused by aerial spraying of
pesticides.
B. DESTRUCTION OF HABITAT
Airport designers can give a higher priority to the preserva-
tion of wildlife habitat when locating airports. The FAA should
not approve any airport construction proposal that will nega-
tively impact the habitat, food sources, or flight path of a listed
species. Courts should find any FAA approval of an airport ex-
pansion or relocation plan to be arbitrary and capricious if listed
species are impacted, and should require the input of the FWS.
C. NOISE
Airports, aircraft designers, and pilots can all play a role in
noise abatement. Because runway orientation and placement
may have the most significant impact, airport designers should
avoid locating runways near wildlife refuges, parks, or other sen-
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sitive areas. Aircraft should be designed to minimize noise. In
addition, where multiple runways are available, aircraft may be
assigned by air traffic controllers to use a runway over sparsely-
populated or less sensitive areas. Steeper glide paths initiated by
pilots may decrease the noise impact on neighbors.253 Cutting
back on power after achieving a safe elevation after takeoff may
also reduce noise levels. 25 4 Courts should be more willing to im-
pose liability for nuisance when noise impacts neighbors of air-
ports and should also be willing to find inverse condemnation in
extreme cases. The FAA should have more restrictive regula-
tions on engine noise and should encourage development of
better standards to measure potential noise impact on humans,
livestock, and wild animals.
D. WATER POLLUTION FROM DE-ICING RUNOFF
Pilots and airlines should insist on using less harmful de-icing
chemicals and should use only the minimum amount required
to be effective. Airport designers should design drainage systems
that collect runoff and filter out the harmful chemicals before
release into waterways. The FAA should regulate the quantity
and type of de-icing chemicals used and the design of airport
drainage systems. Airport managers can have a significant im-
pact by specifying use of only potassium acetate or sodium for-
mate, which are less biologically harmful than ethylene glycol.
The Albany International Airport in Albany, New York, has a
state-of-the-art filtration system that filters the propylene glycol
from the rainwater runoff.255 The propylene glycol is converted
to methane gas, which is then used in a co-generating plant to
provide heat for one of the airport buildings. The end product
of the cycle is clean water and harmless gases. Heat and other
mechanical devices to chip off ice and snow can also be used.
The EPA has suggested other steps to prevent water contamina-
251 hudamrtion. Congress should provide the EPA with a more active
role in FAA decisions, similar to the cooperation required be-
tween the FAA and the EPA regarding aircraft emissions set
forth in 14 C.F.R. § 34.3.
253 See NoRMAN ASHFORD & PAUL H. WRIGHT, AIRPORT ENGINEERING 497 (John
Wiley & Sons 1992).
254 Id.
255 Interview with John O'Donnell, Chief Operating Officer, Albany County
Airport Authority (Sept. 17, 2004).
256 Bulletin, supra note 189.
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E. EMISSIONS
Aircraft designers should strive to create aircraft engines that
pollute less and the FAA and EPA should require that goals to
reduce emissions be reached. Courts should require the FAA to
consider the impact of increased air pollution in every EIS
where increased air traffic will result.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FAA has been given wide authority over all issues affect-
ing aviation. The FAA has failed in its obligation to protect the
environment. Courts should be less deferential to the FAA in
enforcing the laws that exist to protect our environment. More
specifically, courts should defer only to FAA decisions that di-
rectly affect aviation safety. The FAA is not an expert in air or
water pollution, or the impact of noise on humans or animals,
and, therefore, FAA determinations in these areas should not be
given deference by the courts. FAA decisions that minimize envi-
ronmental harm over other considerations should be deemed
arbitrary and capricious. FAA decisions that do not involve the
input of the EPA or FWS, where appropriate, should also be
deemed arbitrary and capricious.
NEPA should require not only a hard look at environmental
concerns but should require such concerns to take priority over
concerns of economy or convenience. The CWA should be
amended to clarify that pesticides are pollutants and should
limit the amount of pesticides applied aerially. Congress should
give authority to the EPA to oversee decisions of the FAA that
will impact the environment.
Aviation is an important industry as well as a pleasurable pas-
time. Aviation interests need not conflict with environmental in-
terests, but care must be taken by all parties involved.
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